Transparency Would Help to Address the Audit Market Problem; Response to the consultation on the Interim Report of the Market Participants Group on Choice in the UK Audit Market. Bruegel Policy Contribution/July 2007 by Veron, Nicolas.
JULY 2007
TRANSPARENCY WOULD 
HELP TO ADDRESS THE 
AUDIT MARKET PROBLEM  
Response to the consultation on the Interim Report of the 
Market Participants Group on Choice in the UK Audit Market
NICOLAS VÉRONAddressing the Audit Market Problem Requires Audit Network Transparency 
 
Response by Nicolas Véron 
to the consultation on the Interim Report of the Market Participants Group  
on Choice in the UK Audit Market 
 
6 July 2007 
 
 
Mr. Julian Rose 
Secretary, Market Participants Group 
Financial Reporting Council 
5th Floor, 71-91 Aldwych 
London, WC2B 4HN 
 
Dear Mr Rose,  
 
This is my personal response to the April 2007 Interim Report of the Market Participants 
Group, which was established in October 2006 to provide advice to the United Kingdom’s 
Financial  Reporting  Council  (FRC)
1.  It  follows  my  response  last  year  to  the  FRC’s 
consultation on its May 2006 discussion paper on Choice in the UK Audit Market
2.  
The market for audit services to large international companies is dominated by only four 
international  networks,  commonly  referred  to  as  the  ‘Big  Four’.  This  situation  is 
unsatisfactory and represents a significant problem for global capital markets and for the 
accounting  industry  itself
3.  Competition  among  the  Big  Four  is  often  fierce,  but  the 
possibility that the limited number of players have negative consequences on the quality 
of financial information must be analysed and discussed. The FRC deserves much praise 
for its leadership in raising this issue and fostering a debate that goes well beyond the 
United Kingdom.  
 
The Audit Market Problem is Part of a Broader Debate 
This response is based on the Interim Report. However, it must be stressed at the outset 
that  discussion  of  this  question  can  only  be  envisaged  as  part  of  a  larger,  worldwide 
debate on the role of audits.  
The debate includes several items. One is the definition and assessment of audit quality. 
Another is the so-called ‘expectations gap’, i.e. the notion that investors are expecting 
more from audits than audit firms are willing to deliver. A third one is the liability risk on 
audit  firms  or  networks,  and  how  this  risk  can  be  managed.  And  a  fourth  one  is  the 
structure of the audit market, to which the Interim Report is devoted.  
These items are strongly interrelated. Audit quality is linked to the incentives that apply 
to audit international networks, national firms, and individual audit partners. The role of 
incentives has been illustrated in various cases in which low-quality audits resulting in 
significant investor damage have been linked to features of the auditor’s business model, 
such as high volumes of consulting correlated with the audit work in the well-publicized 
cases  of  Waste  Management  and  Enron  –  even  though  this  is  by  no  means  the  only 
dimension of the Enron audit failure. The ‘expectations gap’, which a document from the 
                                                 
1  The  Interim  Report  can  be  downloaded  at:  http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Visio-
Choice%20MPG%20Interim%20Report%20web.pdf  
2 The response, published by Bruegel in August 2006, can be downloaded at www.bruegel.org/1427  
3 The shorthand ‘audit market problem’ is used in the rest of this text.  six  largest  worldwide  audit  networks
4  describes  as  relating  to  ‘material  fraud  and  the 
ability of the auditors to uncover it at reasonable cost’, will inevitably grow larger if audit 
firms  face  a  reduction  in  their  incentives  to  discover  malpractice,  or  to  report  it  if 
discovered.  Exposure  to  liability  and  reputation  risk  de  facto  constitutes  such  an 
incentive. Also, the small number of global audit networks with a capacity to serve large 
multinational  companies  has  given  rise  to  fears  of  regulatory  leniency  towards  them 
which, if accurate, could also reduce the incentives for audit quality – the so-called ‘too 
few to fail’ argument.  
The debate is made broader still by the fact that it cannot be restricted to one single 
country.  While  the  FRC’s  remit  covers  the  UK,  one  important  reason  why  there  are 
significant  barriers  to  entry  on  the  market  for  audit  services  to  large  multinational 
companies is that any new entrant must display an ability to serve clients all around the 
globe, which is extremely difficult to establish. In fact, I can think of no other service 
market for which the requirement for a global presence at the outset of an assignment 
constitutes such a high barrier to entry. Therefore, this particular market cannot be seen 
as local; on the contrary, it is precisely its global features that create the audit market 
problem.  Audit  services  to  companies  other  than  the  large  international  ones  are 
generally provided by a larger number of audit firms, including non-Big Four ones. In 
spite of the importance of the UK audit market per se, it is unlikely that a market-led or 
public-policy initiative covering only the UK could make any significant difference unless 
it can trigger meaningful effects at international level. Therefore, in order to succeed, any 
action needs to be prepared with a view to the international context.  
The situation in this respect is more favourable than a year ago. Partly as a consequence 
of the FRC’s initiative, there is more international awareness of the risks posed by the 
current degree of market concentration. On 17 May 2007, US Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson announced that a high-level group, to be co-chaired by former SEC Chairman 
Arthur Levitt and former SEC Chief Accountant Donald Nicolaisen, would look at the audit 
market and at what he called ‘legitimate questions about the sustainability of the auditing 
profession's business model’.  
 
No Short-Term Fix 
The  Interim  Report  rightly  acknowledges  that  there  is  no  apparent  way  to  bring 
significant improvement to the competitive situation of the market for audit services to 
large international companies in the short term, apart from a break-up of existing firms 
which the Interim Report does not recommend. It makes clear that the full effect of its 
proposed measures can only be envisaged in the long term, with some positive impact 
being reached in the medium term but not on audit services to the largest international 
companies.  
This time perspective appears correct to me, even though its implications are somewhat 
disturbing. The audit market problem could give rise to a short-term crisis. If one of the 
Big  Four  networks  were  to  unravel  –  an  event  that  can  be  sudden,  as  the  demise  of 
Arthur Andersen proved in 2002 – the provisional recommendations of the Interim Report 
would not be sufficient to solve the significant difficulties of a market situation in which 
only  three  global  networks  would  remain.  Were  such  an  event  to  occur,  there  would 
perhaps be no other option than a voluntary or forced break-up of one or several of the 
remaining audit network(s), a development which is sure to be painful, is not presently 
desired by the audit networks or other market participants, and whose potential impact 
has not yet (to my knowledge) been assessed in depth by regulators or other parties.  
This may provide a strong incentive for audit quality and crisis prevention. Indeed, there 
seems to be widespread agreement that audit quality has generally increased since 2002. 
Moreover, capital markets have been buoyant since 2003, thus reducing the risk of major 
accounting  crises.  But  the  fact  remains  that  all  available  scenarios  imply  living  for  a 
                                                 
4 ‘Global Capital Markets and the Global Economy: A Vision from the CEOs of the International Audit Networks’, 
November 2006. This text can be downloaded at www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com.  certain time without any adequate crisis management framework other than the break-
up option. And the latter would be a very radical and possibly disruptive or impractical 
option, for which the case, it seems to me, has not been made convincingly at this point 
in the debate. Present efforts should be focused on reaching a lasting improvement at 
global level, not at providing short-term fixes.  
 
A Problem of ‘Supply’ rather than ‘Demand’ 
In my response last year, I wrote that ‘the main obstacle to non-Big Four firms becoming 
the auditors of large international companies resides in such firms’ actual capabilities or 
lack of them’. Developments since then do not seem to indicate a significant change in 
the current situation where the Big Four networks appear to provide superior worldwide 
coverage and consistency of service compared to other providers.  
I agree with the Interim Report’s assessment of provisional recommendations (numbered 
5  to  7)  aiming  at  reducing  the  risks  associated  with  selecting  a  non-Big  Four  firm  as 
auditor,  and  with  its  provisional  recommendations  (numbered  8  to  10)  directed  at 
improving the accountability of boards for their auditor selection decisions. But I doubt 
that these measures alone can do much to reduce the dominance of the Big Four firms 
on the market for audit services to large international companies. To use the same words 
as the Interim Report, the core of the audit market problem is an issue of ‘supply’ rather 
than of ‘demand’.  
 
Leadership is to be Shown by the Profession 
The Interim Report’s preference for market-based measures is commendable. Audit is a 
highly regulated industry, and this may be one of the reasons why market entry barriers 
for  audit  services  to  large  international  companies  are  so  high.  Further  regulatory 
intervention should be seen as a matter of last resort. It would be far preferable for the 
profession  to  show  leadership  in  resolving  or  at  least  mitigating  the  audit  market 
problem. However, in the absence of such leadership, regulators may have to consider 
their own options.  
This  link  was  illustrated  in  the  United  States  by  two  contrasting  developments,  at  a 
quarter-century’s interval. In 1977, following foreign corruption scandals and the high-
profile bankruptcy of Penn Central Railroad, Congress discussed federal regulation of the 
accounting profession but the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
successfully argued that a self-regulatory system based on careful peer review and an 
independent Public Oversight Board (POB) would be preferable. In 2002, however, the 
Enron scandal and the subsequent demise of Arthur Andersen were met with defensive 
attitudes from the US accounting profession and AICPA. The AICPA’s refusal to envisage 
far-reaching reforms led to the embarrassing resignation of the POB in January 2002, 
and  paved  the  way  for  the  termination  of  auditors’ self-regulation  in  the  US  with  the 
creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of July 2002
5.  
There  are  parallels  to  the  present  situation.  The  accounting  profession  has  taken 
leadership in acknowledging that it needed to look beyond its immediate clients’ desires 
and reach out to its ultimate stakeholders, the users of financial information and, most 
prominent among them, the investor community. This was illustrated by the Global Public 
Policy Symposium, a joint initiative of the Big Four together and two other international 
audit networks (BDO and Grant Thornton), which held its first meeting in November 2006 
with a strong emphasis on dialogue with investors.  
By contrast, there is some risk in the accounting profession’s current advocacy of limiting 
the  liability  of  auditors.  The  argument  is  that  a  single  large  liability  could  bring  the 
downfall of a Big Four audit firm, with harmful consequences for the marketplace, and 
                                                 
5  See  the  March  2002  congressional  hearing  of  Charles  Bowsher,  last  chairman  of  the  POB,  available  at 
http://banking.senate.gov/02_03hrg/031902/bowsher.htm.  that liabilities should therefore be limited or capped. But this line of advocacy can also be 
described as an endorsement of the ‘too-few-to-fail’ argument, i.e. that the willingness to 
preserve the current market structure leads to more leniency towards the audit firms’ 
possible failings.  
Liability limitation may in any case not suffice to avert the risk of disappearance of one of 
the Big Four. Indeed, no authoritative case has been made that Arthur Andersen could 
have  survived  if  it  had  not  been  indicted  in  the  Enron  case.  Many  observers  think 
Andersen  was  condemned  to  go  down  anyway  because  of  collapse  of  client  trust, 
especially after the WorldCom scandal proved that what underlay its crisis was more than 
just  ‘a  few  bad  apples’  in the  Houston  office.  Even  the  hands-on  involvement  of  Paul 
Volcker, one of the most respected individuals in the international financial community, 
did not prevent Andersen from collapse. Market pressure, rather than liability issues or 
regulatory action, also played a key role when Misuzu (affiliated with PwC) exited the 
Japanese audit market earlier this year.  
This  is  not  to  deny  the  seriousness  of  the  liability  issue.  It  cannot  be  excluded  that 
liability issues might endanger one or several of the Big Four firms. The corresponding 
risks  create  difficulties  for  the  firms  to  recruit and  retain  the  best  minds  as  partners, 
which is no good thing in terms  of audit quality. And if the risks materialise, it could 
prove brutally unfair to many people, as was the case when the collapse of Andersen 
destroyed the wealth of many partners of Andersen US who had done nothing wrong. But 
this does not mean that these risks justify a de facto promise of bail-out in the form of 
public protection against legal liability.  
By giving the appearance  of pushing hard for a reform that may be depicted as self-
serving and reducing the incentives for audit quality, there is a risk of diminishing public 
trust  in  audits  and  of  increasing  the  ‘expectations  gap’  that  the  audit  profession 
otherwise rightly wants to reduce. Rather than insisting on a quick legislative change on 
this  issue,  the  profession  should  focus  first  on  making  its  case  to  the  investment 
community and other users of financial information. If liability reform were to diminish 
users’ trust in audits, the accounting profession would have scored an own goal against 
its long-term interest.  
 
Greater Transparency is Needed for Reform 
Transparency  is  an  area  in  which  the  accounting  profession  could  show  a  lot  of 
leadership, and in which regulators might eventually intervene if no change comes from 
the  profession  itself.  I  see  transparency  in  the  international  networks’  financials  and 
governance as a prerequisite for reform of other important matters such as audit liability 
and the structure of the audit market.  
Some countries, including the United Kingdom, have already introduced a framework that 
requires  audit  firms  to  disclose  audited  financial  statements  and  elements  of  their 
corporate  governance  arrangements,  thus  shedding  light  on  their  business  model, 
incentives, and economic constraints. The so-called 8
th European Directive will force an 
improvement in audit firm transparency across the EU, starting in 2008.  
But even taking into account planned changes under the 8
th Directive, too little will be 
publicly  known  about  the  international  audit  networks  to  inform  the  debate  on  audit 
reform. The enormously important role of these networks in maintaining public trust in 
capital markets justifies that they be submitted to a level of disclosure that allows the 
public to understand their business model and incentives. Therefore, steps towards more 
disclosure  must  be  envisaged,  preferably  as  an  initiative  of  the  networks  themselves. 
Some audit firms, such as Mazars, have already expressed such leadership by publishing 
internationally consolidated or combined audited financial statements. The Big Four must 
move in that direction. As Colin Sharman, then KPMG’s International Chairman, urged as 
early as 2000: “How can secrecy be justified? How can professional partnerships aspire 
to be real business advisors if their own businesses are closed books? I urge you to open your books before regulatory pressures insist, before  clients insist,  before shareholder 
organisations insist”
6.  
This  disclosure  should  not  be  restricted  to  the  national  level.  The  demise  of  Arthur 
Andersen has shown the somewhat illusory character of a description of those networks 
as a collection of legally independent national firms. When Andersen US collapsed, its 
sister firms in other countries followed and each of them was eventually absorbed by 
another of the Big Four,  even though the vast majority had no large liability or even 
reputation risk in the Enron case. Therefore, any understanding of the business model 
and incentives of the international audit networks should include transparency in their 
financials and governance.  
This  should  include  both  consolidated  financial  statements  of  national  firms,  and 
combined financial statements of each international network, using a generally accepted 
set  of  accounting  norms  such  as  International  Financial  Reporting  Standards  (IFRS). 
These  financial  statements  should  evidently  be  audited,  as  the  UK  example  proves  is 
possible  in  spite  of  the  competition.  Some  oversight  of  this  financial  disclosure  by 
national public oversight bodies (such as the FRC in the UK or PCAOB in the US) should 
probably be envisaged as well to enhance the credibility of the process. For the combined 
accounts of the international networks, the public oversight body of the country in which 
the  main  international  partnership  of  the  network  is  legally  registered  could  play  a 
coordinating role, with exchanges of practices within the recently created International 
Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR).  
Disclosure  should  also  include  more  details  about  the  networks’  and  national  firms’ 
governance, taking into account their current legal form as partnerships. Because of this, 
the  reference  standards  of  disclosure,  which  could  be  applied  using  the  ‘comply  or 
explain’ approach, may be different from those in use for publicly listed firms, such as 
the UK Combined Code which the Interim Report refers to (provisional recommendation 
14). Standards of disclosure should aim to clarify the incentives at network, firm, office, 
and  partner  level,  thus  allowing  a  better  assessment  of  the  context  that  may  favour 
optimal  audit  quality.  To  what  extent  such  disclosures  might  include  individual  senior 
partner  remuneration  remains  open  to  discussion.  Preferably,  these  standards  of 
disclosure should be prepared by the profession itself, based on an in-depth consultation 
of its stakeholder base and especially of the user community. If no momentum comes 
from  the  profession,  their  preparation  could  be  envisaged  by  international  groups  of 
regulators such as IFIAR and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), building on the existing basis including the 8
th European Directive. The OECD 
guidelines for multinational enterprises
7 could serve as a useful reference.  
Such transparency would be essential for both the debate on auditor liability and that on 
the structure of the audit market:  
￿  Financial  transparency  would  help  the  public  understand  the  true  stakes  in  audit 
liability  and  the  cost  of  audit  risk;  the  national  level  of  disclosure  is  especially 
important  in  this  respect.  This  public  understanding  is  indispensable  to  forming  a 
consensus  on  which  legislative  provisions  governing  audit  firm  liability  might  be 
appropriate.  
￿  Financial transparency would shed light on the international audit networks’ business 
model, provided segment information is of high quality and includes separate income 
statements for audit (and immediately related) services. This would allow the public 
and  potential  investors  to  understand  both  the  prospects  for  successful  new  entry 
onto their market, and possible obstacles to it. Potential new entrants, outside the 
narrow circle of today’s international audit networks, currently have no way of reliably 
assessing market potential given the lack of reliable public data.  
                                                 
6 Speech to the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ireland, June 2000.  
7  http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/LinkTo/daffe-ime-wpg(2000)9.  See  item  3  on  page  12  for  the 
scope of application, in which my understanding is that the Big Four audit networks can be included.  Some might argue that transparency should be provided only to regulators and public 
oversight bodies, rather than to the general public. But research (as well as experience) 
shows that public disclosure can be more efficient than mere disclosure to regulators, 
because  regulators  are  not  always  best  placed  to  detect  problems  or  act  on  them
8. 
Therefore,  there  should  be  both  public  disclosure  on  essential  items  such  as  those 
mentioned above, and more in-depth disclosure to public oversight bodies, as exists in 
the banking sector, at least for the majority of banks which are publicly listed.  
 
Ownership Reform Opens Promising Prospects of Improvement 
One of the Interim Report’s key insights is the recognition that audit firms’ ownership 
rules,  initially  designed  to  ensure  appropriate  incentives  and  protect  auditors’ 
independence,  may  have  become  an  obstacle  to  the  adaptation  of  the  accounting 
profession to current challenges. Audit services to large international companies are now 
a heavily knowledge- and capital-intensive business, and the limitations on the ownership 
of firms that deliver it are likely to hamper the possibility of investment by new entrants. 
I therefore wholeheartedly approve provisional recommendation 1 of the Interim Report, 
which encourages the  FRC to ‘promote  wider understanding of the  possible effects  on 
audit choice of changes to audit firm ownership rules’.  
Expectations  of  such  effects,  though,  should  be  cautiously  managed.  While  ownership 
reform offers promising prospects for the audit market, it is unlikely to resolve the audit 
market problem at a stroke, and the possible downsides must also be analysed.  
Credit  rating  agencies  are  examples  of  players  which  have  built  a  reputation  for 
independence in the examination and processing of financial information, without being 
subject to specific ownership rules. Among critics of credit rating agencies, of which there 
are many, few argue that they should be transformed into partnerships. But apart from 
the  obvious  fact  that  credit  rating  and  audit  are  two  very  different  businesses,  this 
example shows that the absence of ownership limitation is no guarantee of bringing more 
players into the market. In fact, the largest three credit rating agencies have consistently 
purchased emerging new entrants for decades, so that their collective dominance of the 
credit rating market has remained unchallenged.  
The  media  sector  is  another  point  of  comparison.  It  shows  both  that  powerful  and 
indispensable information intermediaries can operate with no specific ownership rules (in 
many countries at least), and simultaneously that the independence of such actors under 
private ownership in concentrated markets can never be taken for granted, even though 
this market does not entail the same barriers to entry as the market for audit services to 
large international companies.  
Increased transparency on audit networks’ business model and financials would increase 
the chances of success of ownership rules reform by informing potential investors of the 
possible  economic  rewards  of  entry  into  the  audit  market.  As  argued  earlier,  this  can 
have meaningful consequences only if implemented at international level and not just in 
the UK. Similarly, changes in ownership rules should be discussed at international level to 
have any chance of impact.  
 
Wrap-Up 
Not enough attention was devoted to the audit market problem at the time of widespread 
corporate scandals and financial reform in 2001-02, and the magnitude of the problem 
now  calls  for  action.  However,  any  action  must  be  based  on  strong  evidence  and 
preferably  be  market-based,  which  calls  for  strong  leadership  from  the  accounting 
profession  itself,  and  by  the  investor  community,  which  includes  the  most  prominent 
users of financial information.  
                                                 
8 See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, and Luigi Zingales, “Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?”, NBER 
Working Paper No. 12882, February 2007.  Because we need more evidence before action, short-term attention should be given as a 
priority to more transparency from the international audit networks about their financials 
and  governance  arrangements.  This  should  go  further  than  the  Interim  Reports’ 
provisional  recommendation  2  by  covering  the  networks’  international  activity  and 
mandating  the  use  of  generally  accepted  accounting  norms  such  as  IFRS  for  national 
consolidated  financials  and  international  combined  financials.  Transparency  about 
governance should also go beyond the requirements of existing national legislation and 
the  8
th  European  Directive,  in  order  to  give  the  public  a  meaningful  picture  of  the 
networks’ international and national business model, incentives, and financial strength.  
The  same  need  for  evidence  favours  waiting  for  more  financial  transparency  from 
international audit networks before taking any significant regulatory action. This applies 
to  auditors’  liability.  The  ‘fear  of  God’  that  has  gripped  audit  networks  following  the 
collapse  of  Arthur  Andersen  appears  to  have  served  capital  markets  well,  with  most 
observers acknowledging an improvement in audit quality since 2002. Regulators should 
make sure they do not lower the incentives for audit quality, especially as the possibility 
of less favourable market conditions in the near future may increase the level of audit 
risk.  
Evidence should also be sought on issues that have a significant bearing on the audit 
debate, and on which the current level of public understanding is insufficient. Two items 
are of particular significance. First, given the huge impact of Andersen’s collapse in 2002, 
we  need  a  shared  analysis  on  why  it  happened  instead  of  the  current  divergence  of 
opinions. Second, we need a diagnosis of the current competition situation at European 
and at global level, of the same level of quality as the 2003 Government Accountability 
Office report on the US audit market, and the 2006 Oxera study (jointly commissioned by 
the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  and  the  FRC)  on  the  UK  audit  market.  The 
initiative for such evidence-gathering could come from market participants (including the 
accounting profession), or public institutions (at national, EU, or international level), or 
both.  
Reform of the ownership rules applying to audit firms holds the promise of lowering some 
of the barriers to market entry for audit services to large international companies. While 
no  panacea,  such  reform  is  a  very  welcome  prospect,  which  the  FRC  should  further 
elaborate  on,  and  champion  internationally.  It  too  would  be  enhanced  by  more 
transparency  on the part of existing audit networks, as the information provided may 
help  potential  external  investors  to  assess  the  economic  attraction  of  investing  in  the 
audit sector.  
 
I hope these elements prove useful for the FRC’s reflections.  
Yours sincerely,  
 
 
Nicolas Véron 
Research Fellow, Bruegel 
Contact: phone +32 473 815 372, email n.veron@bruegel.org  
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￿  Mr  Pierre  Delsaux,  Director  for  Free  Movement  of  Capital,  Company  Law  and  Corporate  Governance, 
Directorate-General for the Internal Market, European Commission 
￿  Mr Jeffrey Lucy, Chairman, International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators 
￿  Mr Philippe Richard, Secretary General, International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
￿  Mr Ethiopis Tafara, Head of International Affairs, US Securities and Exchange Commission 